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Abstract 11 
Purpose - The issuance of debt as a corporate governance mechanism introduces a 12 
different agency problem, the asset substitution problem noted as the agency cost of 13 
debt. Thus, there is a recognised need for models that can resolve the agency problem 14 
between the debtholder and the manager who acts on behalf of the shareholder, 15 
leading to efficient financial management systems and enhanced firm value. The 16 
purpose of this paper is to model the debtholder-manager agency problem as a 17 
dynamic game and resolve the conflicts of interests. 18 
 19 
Design/methodology/approach - This paper uses the differential game framework 20 
to analyse the incongruity of interests between the debtholder and the manager as a 21 
non-cooperative dynamic game and determine the optimal capital structure which 22 
minimizes the marginal agency cost of debt and further resolves the conflicts of 23 
interests as a cooperative game via a Pareto-efficient outcome. The model is applied 24 
to a case study company. 25 
 26 
Findings - The optimal capital structure required to minimize the marginal cost of the 27 
agency problem is a higher use of debt, lower cost of equity and withheld capital 28 
distributions. The debtholder is also able to enforce cooperation from the manager by 29 
providing a lower and stable cost of debt and greater debt facility in the overtime 30 
framework.  31 
 2 
 32 
Originality/value - The study develops a model based on the integrated issues of 33 
capital structure, corporate governance, agency problems and differential game theory 34 
and applies the differential game approach to minimize the agency problem between 35 
the debtholder and the manager. 36 
 37 
Keywords: Modelling, Simulation 38 
 39 
1 Introduction  40 
The optimal capital structure is a classic issue in corporate finance and management. 41 
There has been a lot of contributions to observe the effect of the asset substitution 42 
moral hazard problem on the firm’s capital structure. However, there is a need for more 43 
research and development of models to mitigate this problem in a dynamic framework. 44 
Implementing good corporate governance mechanisms and contracts in determining 45 
optimal capital structure will result in efficient financial management by minimizing the 46 
effects of agency problems. 47 
The issuance of debt as a corporate governance mechanism (Jensen & Meckling 48 
1976) introduces the agency cost of debt known as the asset substitution problem 49 
(Green, Richard C. & Talmor 1986). Due to the limited liability of shareholders, debt 50 
finance provides shareholders with an impetus to select riskier projects to maximize 51 
his value against the preferences of debtholders (Jensen & Meckling 1976). The 52 
agency cost of asset substitution results in the reduction of a company’s total firm 53 
value due to consequences of risk-shifting (Vanden 2009). This implies that the 54 
company’s ‘first-best’ exercise policy of maximizing the firm value is replaced with the 55 
‘second-best’ exercise policy of maximizing equity value (Wang, H, Xu & Yang 2018). 56 
The problem is also significant because a company’s payout policy is influenced by 57 
the extent of the agency conflicts between its shareholders and debtholder (Lepetit et 58 
al. 2018). Although agency cost does not consistently increase with the use of debt 59 
(Mao 2003), higher tax rates exacerbate the risk-shifting incentives and debt-overhang 60 
problem (Wang, H, Xu & Yang 2018). The agency conflicts of interests are also 61 
worsened by director interlocks (Ramaswamy 2019). 62 
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Debt contract can be perfectly represented as an incentive contract. In the incentive 63 
contract, the principal induces the agent by taking penal actions when the agent 64 
commits a sub-optimal effort. Similarly, in the debt contract, the debtholder legally 65 
obliges the firm to enforce its interest payments (cost of debt) irrespective of the firm’s 66 
financial position. The debtholder can impose a penalty on the firm and its manager 67 
when cheating arises (Shah & Abdul-Majid 2019). 68 
A manager encounters the following significant issues: What is the optimal level of 69 
coupon or cost of debt and cost of equity that minimizes the marginal effect of the 70 
agency cost of debt on the firm? What is the optimal capital structure required to 71 
minimize the impact of the debtholder’s penal actions on the firm in the case of non-72 
cooperation? What are the incentives provided by the debtholder to discourage risk-73 
shifting? In contrast, the debtholder faces how to maximise his investments in the 74 
company and the design of sufficient and sustainable incentives to induce the 75 
manager to protect his interest in the firm. 76 
In this paper, we provide an analysis to observe the impact of moral hazard on the 77 
firm’s capital structure as a non-cooperative game and further obtain a Pareto-efficient 78 
outcome to minimize the agency conflicts of interests between the debtholder and the 79 
manager in a dynamic framework. Following Beladi and Quijano (2013), in this study, 80 
the manager is assumed to act on behalf of the shareholder due to the firm’s 81 
indebtedness.  82 
The goals of the study are to a) analyse the debtholder-manager dynamic agency 83 
relationship as a non-cooperative game using the Nash open-loop and feedback 84 
equilibrium outcomes, b) obtain the Pareto-efficient outcomes for the debtholder and 85 
the manager as well as the optimal capital structure for the firm via differential game 86 
model, and c) design contracts and strategies to minimize the agency conflicts of 87 
interests between the debtholder and the manager for specifying the optimal capital 88 
structure of a company in a dynamic framework.  89 
The paper is organized as follows, Section 1 and 2 introduces and provides 90 
background for the study. Section 3 discusses the material and methods. This includes 91 
the Nash equilibrium game analysis and Pareto analysis of the model. Section 4 92 
discusses the implication of the study for optimal capital structure, corporate 93 
 4 
governance and dynamic agency theory. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and 94 
concludes the study. 95 
 5 
2 Background 96 
This study is linked to several clusters of literature in management and finance. The 97 
first cluster are the studies of optimal capital structure such as Fischer, Heinkel and 98 
Zechner (1989), Leland (1994, 1998), Elton and Gruber (1974), Goldstein, Ju and 99 
Leland (2001), Titman and Tsyplakov (2007), Tian (2016), Schorr and Lips (2019), to 100 
name few. These studies examine the optimal static/dynamic capital structure for a 101 
firm and were limited to results for a shareholder. The major difference in this new 102 
study is that it examines the determinant of capital structure arising from the agency 103 
costs of debts due to the debtholder-manager conflicts of interests, while the previous 104 
studies do not. Their studies do not consider the impact of conflicts of interests (due 105 
to the use of debts) on optimal capital structure.  106 
The second cluster of literature fundamental to this study introduces the moral hazard 107 
problem called the asset substitution or risk-shifting problem such as Jensen and 108 
Meckling (1976), Heinrich (2002), and  Wang, H, Xu and Yang (2018). Jensen and 109 
Meckling (1976) establish that the use of external financing in the form of debt can 110 
modify the optimal operating strategy of a firm by giving shareholders an impetus to 111 
select riskier projects against the preferences of debtholders. Moreover, the payoff of 112 
a shareholder is convex in the profit stream of an indebted firm whereas the payoff of 113 
a debtholder is concave (Heinrich 2002). The debtholder anticipates more risk-shifting 114 
due to the manager’s increased equity assets in the company, and hence imposes a 115 
higher cost on the firm which alters its required optimal capital structure (Beladi & 116 
Quijano 2013). This creates a problem for the firm and the manager. 117 
The third cluster are studies that have evaluated the significance of the asset 118 
substitution problem on firm value. This includes via theoretical frameworks Leland 119 
(1998) and Ericsson (2000), simulation methods Parrino and Weisbach (1999), 120 
managerial surveys Graham and Harvey (2001), empirical research Eisdorfer (2008), 121 
optimization Moreno-Bromberg and Rochet (2018), Lepetit et al. (2018), etc. The 122 
difference between these previous studies and our new study is that the former seeks 123 
to establish the impact of the risk-shifting problem on the firm value but does not 124 
resolve the problem.  125 
The last cluster relevant to this study examines the elimination of cost or the impact of 126 
asset substitution in a static or dynamic framework. The first group under this cluster 127 
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are literature focused on minimizing the negative impact of asset substitution on the 128 
debtholder while maximizing the opportunistic benefits to the company such as Childs, 129 
Mauer and Ott (2005) and Vanden (2009). Vanden (2009) and Childs, Mauer and Ott 130 
(2005) suggest the use of structured financing, identified as a company having the 131 
adequate financial flexibility to continuously manage its degree of short-term debts. 132 
These studies seek an internal solution to minimize the resultant loss on total firm 133 
value and consequences for the debtholder but retain the opportunistic benefits for the 134 
firm. The model by Vanden is also limited because it eliminates the tax effect in the 135 
model design. 136 
The second group are literature focused on seeking agency-based approach to 137 
minimize the asset substitution problem. These strategies seek to defend the interests 138 
of the debtholder. These studies include Myers (1977), Green, Richard C (1984), 139 
Hennessy and Tserlukevich (2008), Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), (Chod 2015). Myers 140 
(1977) recommends that the productive life of a company’s asset should be evened 141 
with the debt maturity offered by the debtholder. However, this does not disincentives 142 
a manager from risk-shifting. Smith Jr and Warner (1979) and Wang, J (2017) 143 
recommend debt covenants. The drawback is that debt covenants may limit the firm’s 144 
level of investment as a covenant cannot fully distinguish between a non-rewarding 145 
and a rewarding investment. Thus covenant may unduly impede a good investment 146 
(Edmans & Liu 2011). Brander and Poitevin (1992) and Edmans and Liu (2011) 147 
examine managerial compensation contracts; however, with a significant assumption 148 
that the manager does not take actions on behalf of the shareholder. In this new study, 149 
we assume that the manager takes actions on behalf of the shareholder due to the 150 
firm’s indebtedness. Further, Green, Richard C (1984) suggests replacing straight 151 
debt financing with the use of convertible debt financing, while the convex and concave 152 
domains of the debt contract are stabilized to present the security locally in the form 153 
of equity. Hennessy and Tserlukevich (2008) prove this to be an unrealistic solution in 154 
a dynamic context because equity remains risk-loving as a firm tends to bankruptcy. 155 
Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) and (Chod 2015) propose trade credit as an agency-156 
based measure to mitigate asset substitution. However, their result is limited because 157 
it only favours the possibility of lending goods rather than lending cash, which is not 158 
always a realistic alternative for all companies. Short-term debt has been 159 
recommended as one panacea to the moral hazard problem of asset substitution 160 
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because they are less reactive to the change in the company’s asset (Barnea, Haugen 161 
& Senbet 1980). Moreover, it bridges the information gap between the debtholder and 162 
manager, since it spurs a frequent reporting by the manager on the company’s 163 
performance and operating risk (Jun & Jen 2003). Contrarily, Lopez‐Gracia and 164 
Mestre‐Barberá (2015) find evidence that some Spanish Small-Medium Enterprises 165 
(SMEs) defer to long-term debt to moderate the conflict of interests between the 166 
manager and the debtholder. This current study improves this literature by developing 167 
a model that is flexible for analysis in both a long-term and short-term (debt maturity) 168 
period. The model is developed to enhance a long-term debt contract if the manager 169 
does not renege on the terms of the contract. Sudheer, Wang and Zou (2019) propose 170 
dual ownership can minimize the extent of covenants a company is bound by in its 171 
debt contract. If a debtholder simultaneously holds both equity and debt in company, 172 
this can minimize the incentive conflict by increasing the debtholder’s monitoring 173 
scope and internalizing the conflict. The limitation of this proposition includes that; 174 
debtholders will not always seek an equity interest in a company, not all debt providers 175 
have the legal rights to buy equity interests, and not all firms will be willing to sell equity 176 
interests to its debt provider in order to avoid excess monitoring. 177 
Finally, our paper is related to Liu et al. (2017), Antill and Grenadier (2019), Tran 178 
(2019), Sterman (2010). Liu et al. (2017) examine the impact of incomplete information 179 
on the optimal capital structure under a significant assumption of unobservable firm’s 180 
growth rate. Our study is different because it considers the moral hazard problem of 181 
asset substitution. Antill and Grenadier (2019) analyse the debtholder-manager 182 
relationship; however, with a focus on a manager who deliberately selects a preferred 183 
time to default. In our study, the manager finds the contract and relationship of benefit 184 
to the firm. Tran (2019) furthers the literature on the use of debt covenant in addition 185 
to reputation-building as mechanisms to minimize the agency problem. Sterman 186 
(2010) examines system dynamics and decision-making between various agents in 187 
organisational design. The study noted that decision rules should align with 188 
managerial practices. 189 
In this study, using a dynamic optimization approach, the debtholder selects optimal 190 
or equilibrium strategies as well as trigger strategies which induce the manager from 191 
risk-shifting once the debt contract is active. Similarly, the manager selects the optimal 192 
capital structure that minimizes the effect of the debtholder’s penal actions on the firm. 193 
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Hence, the study employs corporate governance mechanisms to minimize the 194 
conflicts of interests between the debtholder and the manager and simultaneously 195 
optimizes the capital structure of the firm. This modelling work is helpful for managers 196 
in making optimal financing decisions as well as maximizing the debtholder 197 
relationship. Differential game theory is considered because of its suitability in 198 
analysing non-cooperative games as specified above and its use of mathematical 199 
optimization approach. Another advantage of differential game theory founded in 200 
system dynamics is that it has both rigorous mathematical foundations and it is also 201 
valuable for policy makers in solving crucial organisational problems (Sterman 2010). 202 
In a differential game, the objective of one decision maker, here as (debtholder and 203 
manager) impacts the objective of the other and hence the problem from the strategic 204 
interaction becomes a game (de Zeeuw 2014).  205 
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3 A Dynamic Principal-Agent Game Model for an Optimal Capital Structure  206 
3.1 The model setup 207 
In this section, we first specify a dynamic principal-agent model between the 208 
debtholder and the manager with the moral hazard problem for determining an optimal 209 
capital structure. The model incorporates the firm’s capital structure in a continuous-210 
time framework. The exogenous contract implies that the manager takes actions that 211 
are not in the best interest of the debtholder.  We present underlying assumptions for 212 
tax environment, debt contract structure and the dynamic game problem. It is assumed 213 
that the company only issues limited-liability securities (loans), such as bilateral loans, 214 
etc.  215 
The model development process is stated as follows: 216 
I. Company’s liquid reserve 217 
The company’s liquid reserve is significant because it covers the company’s ongoing 218 
operating expenses such as its cost of debt or current finance cost. The liquid reserve 219 
𝑀(𝑡) otherwise tagged as current asset evolves by adding the operating income 𝛽𝑆(𝑡), 220 
the financial income 𝑟𝑀(𝑡) (liquid reserve is assumed to be renumerated at rate 𝑟) 221 
minus cost of debt 𝑐(𝑡) and the cost of equity 𝑙(𝑡). 𝑆(𝑡) is the firm’s productive asset 222 
and 𝛽 is the asset payout rate. This is consistent with Moreno-Bromberg and Rochet 223 
(2018) and Vanden (2009). The evolution of 𝑀(𝑡) can be referred to as the company’s 224 
net earnings stated as: 225 
?̇?(𝑡) = 𝛽𝑆(𝑡) + 𝑟𝑀(𝑡) − 𝑐(𝑡) − 𝑙(𝑡)      (1) 226 
II. Tax and debt financing 227 
A simple tax setting is considered. The firm’s income is taxed at the effective tax rate 228 
𝜃, when 𝜃 > 0, the use of debt shields some of the firm’s income from tax charges. 229 
𝑐(𝑡) denotes the cost of debt associated with the use of debt 𝐷(𝑡) at any time 𝑡. We 230 
assume that the company’s value of debt changes throughout the lifecycle of the firm 231 
depending on its need for new financing in the next period. Thus, the capital structure 232 
is dynamic, a distinction from most capital structure models. However, based on the 233 
agency relationship between the debtholder and the manager, the debtholder 234 
promises to provide more or less debt facility to the firm depending on the manager’s 235 
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discretion to act opportunistically or not in a previous period. Hence, more debt facility 236 
may serve as an incentive. The company’s value of debt is defined as its cost of debt 237 
plus its need for new debt, where 𝛼 represents the ratio of the new value of debt to the 238 
existing value of debt. 239 
?̇?(𝑡) = 𝛼𝐷(𝑡) + 𝑐(𝑡)         (2)                   240 
III. Productive assets 241 
The company’s productive asset impacts the value of the company in any period. The 242 
debtholder may specify that the firm keeps a minimum value of productive assets 243 
throughout the contract. The value of the company’s productive assets 𝑆(𝑡) is 244 
assumed to grow or decline exponentially depending on the difference between the 245 
riskless rate (𝑟) and the payout rate (𝛽):   246 
𝑆(𝑡) = 𝑆0𝑒
(𝑟−𝛽)𝑡,         (3) 247 
IV. Value of equity 248 
In a company’s statement of financial position, total equity 𝐸(𝑡) is defined as: 249 
 𝐸(𝑡) = 𝑀(𝑡) + 𝑆(𝑡) − 𝐷(𝑡)        (4) 250 
The equilibrium/optimal strategies selected by the manager and the debtholder impact 251 
the optimal outcomes of Equations (1 - 4) known as the state variables.  252 
The exogenous debt contract  253 
In the finite horizon differential game, the debtholder makes the first move by offering 254 
a debt contract to the manager. The manager initially accepts the terms and conditions 255 
of the contract but has incentives to renege, by taking unobservable actions (risk-256 
shifting) that can cause it to default on his debt by maximizing 𝑟𝑀(𝑡). This is called the 257 
moral hazard problem. The output process, 𝑀(𝑡), 𝐷(𝑡), 𝑆(𝑡)  are observable by both 258 
the debtholder and the manager. Thus, the game is said to be one with perfect 259 
information but incomplete information because the preference of the manager is 260 
unknown to the debtholder. Since the debtholder does not provide the management 261 
fee, his incentive options to induce the manager are limited. 262 
Differential game problem and utility functions 263 
For simplicity, it is assumed that the firm’s flow of earnings is discounted at a constant 264 
risk-free rate 𝜌 ≥ 0. The agency conflict of interests is formulated as a nonzero-sum 265 
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game problem between two players. Next, we show the differential game problem for 266 
the manager and the debtholder, respectively.  267 
3.1.1 The formulation of the manager’s (agent) problem: The manager’s objective is 268 
to minimize the company’s cost of finance and maximize the value from its asset 269 
substitution. The weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is a compelling and 270 
extensively applied financial theory by both investors and company management. It is 271 
referred to as the cost of financing a company’s activities, otherwise known as the cost 272 
of capital. This is the minimum return a company must realize on its capital asset base 273 
as anticipated by its providers of capital (Reilly & Wecker 1973). In addition, a lower 274 
cost of capital reduces the company’s development and production costs (Sterman 275 
2010). Therefore, the primary financial goal of a company is to find the optimal capital 276 
structure which yields the lowest weighted average cost of capital and maximizes the 277 
value of the company (Zelgalve & Bērzkalne 2011).  278 
The WACC is, therefore set, as the cost function the risk-loving manager seeks to 279 
minimize, while maximizing the financial income of the company 𝑟𝑀(𝑡), the rate of 280 
return on the company’s liquid reserve from asset substitution. To achieve an optimal 281 
capital structure, it is assumed that the manager prefers the responsibility of cost of 282 
equity (or dividend) 𝑙(𝑡) to the responsibility of the cost of debt (interest payment) 𝑐(𝑡). 283 
Cost of debt increases the performance pressure on managers and requires more 284 
measurable efforts (Harris & Raviv 1988). In addition, the manager prefers to dilute 285 
the company’s shares when he fears overreliance on debt. Therefore, the manager’s 286 
problem is to select the optimal cost of equity 𝑙(𝑡), his control variable/strategy that 287 
minimizes cost of capital and maximizes income.  288 
The objective functional of the manager over a finite time horizon is:  289 







𝑐(𝑡)2(1 − 𝜃) − 𝜔3𝑟𝑀(𝑡))𝑑𝑡
𝑇
0
  (5) 290 








1 − 𝜇(𝑡). The first two elements of equation (1) are specified as the WACC, and the 293 
last element represents the maximization of the company’s financial income. 294 
The objective functional of the manager over a finite time horizon is therefore restated 295 
as: 296 
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𝐽1 = min ∫ 𝑒
−𝜌𝑡(𝜔1𝜇(𝑡)𝑙(𝑡)
2 + 𝜔2(1 − 𝜇(𝑡))𝑐(𝑡)
2(1 − 𝜃) − 𝜔3𝑟𝑀(𝑡))𝑑𝑡
𝑇
0
 (6) 297 
Where 𝜔1, 𝜔2, 𝜔3 > 0 are balancing cost factors. The debtholder’s objective functional 298 
is introduced next. 299 
3.1.2 The formulation of the debtholder’s (principal) problem: The risk-averse 300 
debtholder provides the company a debt finance based on the company’s market 301 
value, credit rating and existing relationship. These parameters are used by the 302 
debtholder to categorise the borrower as a safe borrower, hence relying on the theory 303 
of reputation. The debtholder who is assumed to be a secured and senior debtholder 304 
ultimately seeks to maximize the principal value of debt 𝐷(𝑡) issued to the company 305 
at 𝑡 = 0 which comes an opportunity cost 𝛾2 while minimizing the monitoring costs 𝛾1 306 
of obtaining his interest payments 𝑐(𝑡). The debtholder’s problem is to consistently 307 
select the optimal cost of debt 𝑐(𝑡) in each period as his strategy that achieves this. 308 
The principal value of debt and the cost of debt accrued are the fixed claim available 309 
to the debtholder (Sudheer, Wang & Zou 2019). 310 
The debtholder’s payoff functional is specified as: 311 





                                                        (7) 312 
Where 𝛾1, 𝛾2 > 0 are balancing cost factors. The debtholder has no power of decision-313 
making in the firm but is only keen on the firm’s debt valuation and ability to recover 314 
his investments. Equations (6) and (7) represents the different objectives of the 315 
debtholder (principal) and the manager (agent) and the conflicts of interests between 316 
them after debt issuance.  317 
 318 
Parameters used in the model are in Table 1: 319 
Table 1  Parameters used in the model 320 
Parameters Definition 
𝑟 Rate of return on Liquid reserve 𝑟 > 0, assumed to be constant 
𝛽 payout rate of company’s productive assets, assumed to be constant 
𝑐(𝑡) cost of debt (interest payment) 
𝑙(𝑡) cost of equity (dividend) 
𝐸(𝑡) Market value of company equity 
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𝑀(𝑡) Liquid Reserve 
𝑆(𝑡) Value of company’s productive assets 
𝐷(𝑡) Market value of company debt 
𝑉(𝑡) Company’s total capital; 𝑉(𝑡) = 𝐸(𝑡) + 𝐷(𝑡)  
𝜃 Effective tax rate 
𝛼 Ratio of new debt to existing market value of company debt 
𝜌 Discount rate 
 321 
3.1.3 Balancing cost factors 322 
In specifying the objective functionals, it is presumed that there are certain costs 323 
associated with optimising elements of the objective functionals, known as the 324 
balancing cost factors. 𝜔1, 𝜔2, 𝜔3 are specified as inherent transaction and operational 325 
costs incurred by the manager in order to meet its finance costs and maximize its 326 
financial income. Similarly, the debtholder incurs an opportunity cost 𝛾1 on the principal 327 
debt value 𝐷(𝑡) and monitoring cost 𝛾2 to recover the cost of debt 𝑐(𝑡). It is to be noted 328 
that the values of the weight assigned to the balancing cost factors as specified in 329 
Table 3 are merely theoretical for illustrative purposes.  330 
Varying the balancing cost factors 331 
To obtain interesting and useful results for the model, the weight or value assigned to 332 
the balancing cost factors can be varied to understand the impact of certain cost of 333 
optimizing the players’ objectives. The varied balancing cost factors are denoted as 334 
Encounter 1 (E1), Encounter 2 (E2), Encounter 3 (E3).  335 
Encounter 1 – [𝜔1, 𝜔2, 𝜔3] = [2 2 5] and [𝛾1, 𝛾2] = [5, 2]. This implies that the cost of 336 
maximizing the company’s financial income is higher than the cost of minimizing its 337 
finance cost. In the same encounter, it is hypothetically stated that the debtholder 338 
incurs a higher cost to optimize its debt face value than the cost of debt. 339 
Encounter 2 – [𝜔1, 𝜔2, 𝜔3] = [2 2 5] and [𝛾1, 𝛾2] = [5, 10]. The costs associated in 340 
encounter 2 are similar to those of encounter 1, however, with a significant increase 341 
in the cost of recovering the cost of debt than the debt face value. 342 
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Encounter 3 – [𝜔1, 𝜔2, 𝜔3] = [50 2 2] and [𝛾1, 𝛾2] = [5, 2]. In encounter 3, there is a 343 
significant weight on the operational cost of minimizing the company’s cost of equity 344 
than other variables. 345 
This provides different outcomes for the optimal states of the game and the optimal 346 
capital structure of the firm that minimizes the agency problem and thus provides 347 
useful insights. 348 
 349 
Summarily, the model is therefore set out as: 350 
Manager-Debtholder game  351 
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟: 𝐽1 = min ∫ 𝑒
−𝜌𝑡(𝜔1𝜇(𝑡)𝑙(𝑡)
2 + 𝜔2𝑐(𝑡)
2(1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝜇(𝑡)) − 𝜔3𝑟𝑀(𝑡))𝑑𝑡
𝑇
0
   352 





                                                      353 
    354 
Subject to: 355 
?̇?(𝑡) = 𝛽𝑆(𝑡) + 𝑟𝑀(𝑡) − 𝑐(𝑡) − 𝑙(𝑡), 𝑀(0) = 𝑀0    356 
?̇?(𝑡) = 𝛼𝐷(𝑡) + 𝑐(𝑡), 𝐷(0) = 𝐷0      357 
𝑆(𝑡) = 𝑆0𝑒
(𝑟−𝛽)𝑡       358 
𝐸(𝑡) = 𝑀(𝑡) + 𝑆(𝑡) − 𝐷(𝑡),  359 
where 𝜇(𝑡) can also be represented as 𝜇(𝑡) = 1 −
𝐷(𝑡)
𝑀(𝑡)+𝑆(𝑡)
.    360 
  361 
The differential game problem is analysed and solved via adequate equilibrium 362 
concepts, first as a non-cooperative game using the Nash open-loop and Nash 363 
feedback solution concepts. Second, as a cooperative game using the Pareto solution 364 
concept to obtain the optimal results for the capital structure. 365 
3.2 Model solutions 366 
In this section, we solve the agency problem via differential game theory. The general 367 
case with moral hazard is specified as a non-cooperative game. We derive the open 368 
and closed-form solutions by solving the ordinary differential equations (ODEs) with 369 
the associated initial and terminal (boundary) conditions. To minimize the conflicts of 370 
interests, we assume that the manager and debtholder may be able to agree and 371 
cooperate if the debtholder provides enough incentive for the manager, thus providing 372 
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a pareto-efficient outcome. The results are obtained using approximate analytical 373 
methods and by further applying the model to financial data from a company.  374 
3.2.1 Non-cooperative Game Analysis - Nash Equilibrium 375 
3.2.1.1 Open-loop Nash Equilibrium (OLNE) Solution Concept 376 
The agency conflicts of interests between the debtholder and the manager stipulate 377 
the problem as a non-cooperative game. The manager does not comply with the no-378 
risk-shifting terms of the debtholder. Given the debtholder selects an optimal strategy, 379 
the manager must select his optimal strategy to optimize the firm’s capital structure in 380 
a way that minimizes the impact of the debtholder’s penal actions. As a non-381 
cooperative game, we solve the model using the open-loop Nash equilibrium solution 382 
concept where the only available information for action at time 𝑡 is that of the initial 383 
states 𝑀(0) and 𝐷(0). The information scheme does not give the players knowledge 384 
about the changes in state variables, known as pre-commitment (Bressan 2011). This 385 
implies that the debtholder and the manager do not revise their actions nor reconsider 386 










Figure 1 describes the open-loop system of the game. Both players’ strategies 𝑙(𝑡) 397 
and 𝑐(𝑡), cost of equity and cost of debt influence the states of the game 𝑀(𝑡), 𝐷(𝑡). 398 
The systems of the game, ?̇?(𝑡), ?̇?(𝑡) react to the information from the strategies and 399 
states of the game and produce equilibrium state trajectories at the Nash pair of 400 
strategies for which a player cannot improve his outcome (𝐽𝟏, 𝐽𝟐) if he moves from this 401 








Open-loop System of the Game 
𝐽𝟐  𝑐(𝑡) 
Figure 1 Open-loop System of the Game 
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The necessary conditions developed by Pontryagin and his co-workers (Boltyanskii, 403 
Gamkrelidze & Pontryagin 1956) are derived by generating the Hamiltonian. This is 404 
obtained by adjoining the state equations to objective functional for each player with 405 
adjoint or co-state functions, 𝜆𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, 2 for player 1 (the manager) and 𝜙𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, 2 for 406 
player 2 (the debtholder). Hence the Hamiltonian for the manager-debtholder game is 407 









− 𝑟𝜔3𝑀 + 𝜆1(𝛽𝑆 + 𝑟𝑀 − 𝑐 − 𝑙) + 𝜆2(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑐)  (8) 409 
𝐻2 = −𝛾2𝐷 + 𝛾1𝑐
2 + 𝜙1(𝛽𝑆 + 𝑟𝑀 − 𝑐 − 𝑙) + 𝜙2(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑐)    (9) 410 
Where 𝐽2 is multiplied by minus to change the maximization problem to a minimization 411 
problem. The set of necessary conditions makes it possible to identify the equilibrium 412 
time path for the variables and proffers implications for the ideal financial management 413 
policies. The first part of the principle states that each control variable/strategy 414 
selected at any moment in time must have an effect that maximises or minimises the 415 
Hamiltonian. This imply: 416 
𝜕𝐻𝑖(𝑡)
𝜕𝑙(𝑡) 𝑜𝑟 𝜕𝑐(𝑡)
= 0  for all 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐼 and all t  417 




2𝜔1𝑙(𝑀 + 𝑆 − 𝐷)
(𝑀 + 𝑆)




          (10) 420 
This calculation means that the optimal cost of equity for the firm is the ratio of the 421 
value of an added dollar of debt or earnings multiplied by the firm’s total assets, to the 422 
firm’s equity multiplied by two times the balancing cost factor of the use of equity at 423 
any time 𝑡.  This implies that with an increase in the weight on the cost of implementing 424 
equity, the ratio of the company’s total assets to its equity is reduced. A lower asset to 425 








(𝜙1 − 𝜙2)                  (11) 429 
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From equation (11), the optimal cost of debt for the firm is the ratio of the value of an 430 
added dollar of debt to the Debtholder’s cost of monitoring times two. In contrast to 431 
the first result of Modigliani and Miller, in this study, the required optimal cost of equity 432 
was found to be lesser than the required optimal cost of debt when the conflicts of 433 
interests is introduced into the optimal capital structure model. This result is also 434 
contrary to those of Elton and Gruber (1974), where the cost of equity funds equals 435 
the cost of debt funds without the moral hazard problem.  436 
Equations (10) and (11) above are the characterisations of the Nash strategies. 437 
The second necessary conditions necessitate the rate of change with respect to time 438 
of each co-state variable to be equivalent to the negative of the partial derivative of 439 
the Hamiltonian with respect to the correlated state variable. 440 
The starting or ending conditions for the adjoint variables can be logically deduced 441 
from the structure of the problem. For example, the present value of a dollar earned 442 
in the infinite future is zero (Elton & Gruber 1974). 443 
The third condition requires that the state equations are achieved.  444 
The optimality system which generates the equilibrium outcomes is a forward-445 
backward system of differential equations stated as follows 446 
?̇? = 𝛽𝑆 + 𝑟𝑀 − 𝑐 − 𝑙,    𝑀(0) = 𝑀0                (12) 447 
?̇? = 𝛼𝐷 + 𝑐,    𝐷(0) = 𝐷0        (13) 448 
?̇?1 = 𝜌𝜆1 −
𝜕𝐻1
𝜕𝑀





    (14) 449 








                                                       (15) 450 
?̇?1 = 𝜌𝜙1 −
𝜕𝐻2
𝜕𝑀
= 𝜙1(𝜌 − 𝑟)       (16) 451 
?̇?2 = 𝜌𝜙2 −
𝜕𝐻2
𝜕𝐷
= 𝜙2(𝜌 − 𝛼) + 𝛾2           (17) 452 
𝜆1(𝑇) = 0 𝜆2(𝑇) = 0 𝜙1(𝑡) = 0 𝜙2(𝑇) = 0 453 








(𝜙1 − 𝜙2)           (19) 456 
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Next, some of the optimal state and adjoint variables are obtained analytically. 457 
The adjoint equations (16) and (17) are independent of other unknown variables and 458 
hence can be solved analytically. First, equation (16); 459 
?̇?1 = (𝜌 − 𝑟)𝜙1 460 
And the solution is  461 
𝜙1 = 𝑘1𝑒
(𝜌−𝑟)𝑡 462 
Where 𝑘1 is the constant of integration, and solving for the constant of integration using 463 
the terminal (transversality) condition this gives: 464 
𝜙1 = 0          (20)   465 




= (𝜌 − 𝛼)𝜙2 + 𝛾2 467 
Using the integrating factor method of integration for 𝜌 ≠ 𝛼, where 𝑒−(𝜌−𝛼)𝑡 is the 468 






From the transversality condition 𝜙2(𝑇) = 0, the constant of integration 𝑘2 is 471 











 𝜌 ≠ 𝛼       (21)  475 








           𝜌 ≠ 𝛼
       (22) 477 













]                                                                       (23) 479 
With 𝐷(0) = 0.27 in Table 2, we have 480 
𝐷∗(𝑡) = 0.27𝑒𝛼𝑡 +
𝑎
𝛼
(𝑒𝛼𝑡 − 1) +
𝑏
(𝜌−2𝛼)
(𝑒𝛼𝑡 − 𝑒(𝜌−𝛼)𝑡)     (25) 481 
  482 
3.2.2 Feedback Nash Equilibrium (FNE) Solution Concept 483 
The alternative to the open-loop Nash case which only relied on the initial state 484 
information, the feedback Nash equilibrium uses information about the current state of 485 
the game in addition to the initial state or remain memoryless, this eliminates the 486 
problem of information non-uniqueness from the equilibria (Yeung & Petrosjan 2006). 487 
This lends to the co-learning theory in which all players attempt to learn their optimal 488 
strategies concurrently (Sheppard 1998). This can also be described as the learning 489 
process of a decision-making system where the sensors receive a signal (Roberts & 490 













In the feedback system of the game, the debtholder and manager choose to consider 504 







    Feedback System of the Game 











Figure 2 Feedback System of the Game 
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company and update their strategies with this information. Hence, the equilibrium state 506 
trajectories and final utility of the players are functions of information (Info) from the 507 
initial strategies 𝑙(𝑡), 𝑐(𝑡) and updated strategies 𝑙𝑢(𝑡), 𝑐𝑢(𝑡). This feedback 508 
information system is reflected in the solution method as a cross-derivative of the Nash 509 
strategy of one player in the Hamiltonian of the other.  510 
The set of necessary conditions to be satisfied in the FNE case are similar to those of 511 
the open-loop Nash Equilibrium case. Although the definition of the optimal strategies 512 
of the manager and debtholder are the same as the open-loop case, there exists a 513 
significant difference in the adjoint equations. The adjoint equations for each player in 514 
the feedback case incorporate the response of the other player to changes in the state 515 
variables thereby impacting the decision making of that player as seen in equations 516 
(26) and (27). This is expressed as a cross-derivative and updates the Nash pair of 517 
strategies of both players as necessary, specifying how each player feeds existing 518 
information in the game back into their decision-making process. 519 
From the Hamiltonian function (7) and (8), the adjoint equations are: 520 




















− 𝜆1 + 𝜆2]           (26) 522 




















− 𝜆1 + 𝜆2]            (27) 524 








       525 
?̇?1 = 𝜙1(𝜌 − 𝑟) 526 









?̇?2 = 𝜙2(𝜌 − 𝛼) + 𝛾2   528 
?̇?1 and ?̇?2 shows that the debtholder does not modify his strategies with the updated 529 
information available about the firm’s change in the cost of equity 𝑙(𝑡) or liquid reserve 530 
information, since the cross-derivative information of the debtholder’s response to 531 
changes in 𝑀(𝑡), 𝐷(𝑡) yields zero. Therefore, the debtholder does not incorporate any 532 
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new information in his selection of an equilibrium strategy. The manager, on the other 533 
hand, updates his optimal strategies due to new information available in the game, as 534 
seen in equations (26) and (27). 535 
?̇? = 𝛽𝑆 + 𝑟𝑀 − 𝑐 − 𝑙       536 
?̇? = 𝛼𝐷 + 𝑐  537 
Also, these co-states functions satisfy the terminal conditions:  538 
𝜆1(𝑇) = 0 𝜆2(𝑇) = 0 𝜙1(𝑡) = 0 𝜙2(𝑇) = 0 539 
The third condition remains that the state equations are achieved.  540 
3.3 Cooperative Game Analysis - Pareto Outcome  541 
The non-cooperative game analysis discussed above elucidates the incongruity of 542 
interests between the players, and thus does not fully resolve the agency problem but 543 
provides optimal strategies to minimize the marginal agency cost of debt. To elicit 544 
corporate governance in the selection of an optimal capital structure and optimizing 545 
the interests of the manager and debtholder, cooperation may be sought between the 546 
players. The Pareto solution concept, also known as the cooperative form of the game, 547 
jointly optimizes all players utility functions over the time interval. It is therefore 548 
presumed that the equilibrium of a cooperative game will be Pareto optimal. This 549 
implies that it is impossible to allocate resources in a way that make a player better off 550 
without leaving the other player at least worse off (Yeung & Petrosjan 2006). Although 551 
the plausibility of cooperation in a typical non-cooperative game may be argued, due 552 
to the difficulty of ensuring congruity, it may be otherwise argued by the so-called 553 
Coase Theorem, this states in part that when one player is affected by the externality 554 
from the other player’s actions, both players (if rational) will transact to reach a Pareto 555 
optimal solution (Coase 1960). That is, if a rational debtholder observes the acute 556 
effect of the manager’s actions on the company’s default tendencies, he will readily 557 













Pareto System of the Game  
Figure 3 Pareto System of the Game 
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Figure 3 describes the Pareto system of the game. The game becomes a seemingly 563 
optimal control system, here, both players agree to jointly optimize their objectives with 564 
respect to a weight assignment as a corporate governance mechanism. The results 565 
from the optimal states and strategies are then imputed in each players utility function 566 
to derive a Pareto Frontier to compare the outcomes for both players. 567 
In the solution concept, the interests of both players are prioritized with respect to the 568 
assigned constant 𝜑 such that 569 
𝜑𝐽1 + (1 − 𝜑)𝐽2 570 
However, a controversial question in most multi-objective literature is the basis for 571 
weight assignment; one way out of this dilemma is to create a Pareto front consisting 572 
of possible weight assignments. Thus, the joint objective functional of the game now 573 
becomes  574 
𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∫ (𝜑𝑒−𝜌𝑡 (𝜔1𝜇(𝑡)𝑙(𝑡)
2 + 𝜔2𝑐(𝑡)
2(1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝜇(𝑡)) − 𝜔3𝑟𝑀(𝑡)))
𝑇
0
+ 𝑒−𝜌𝑡(1 −575 
𝜑)(𝛾1𝑐(𝑡)
2 − 𝛾2𝐷(𝑡))𝑑𝑡                  (28) 576 
The Hamiltonian for the game is specified as  577 








− 𝑟𝜔3𝑀) + (1 − 𝜑)(𝛾1𝑐
2 − 𝛾2𝐷) + 𝜆1(𝛽𝑆 + 𝑟𝑀 − 𝑐 −578 
𝑙) + 𝜆2(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑐)                                           (29) 579 




2𝜔1𝜑𝑙(𝑀 + 𝑆 − 𝐷)
(𝑀 + 𝑆)














                    (31) 584 
?̇?1 = 𝜌𝜆1 −
𝜕𝐻
𝜕𝑀





                            (32) 585 
?̇?2 = 𝜌𝜆2 −
𝜕𝐻
𝜕𝐷





                      (33) 586 
 587 
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The optimal cost of equity for the firm from equation (30) is the ratio of the value of an 588 
added dollar of debt or earnings multiplied by the firm’s total assets, to the firm’s equity 589 
multiplied by two times the balancing cost factor of the use of equity times the assigned 590 
𝜑  at any time 𝑡.  The higher the weight on the cost of implementing equity, the lower 591 
the ratio of the company’s total assets to its equity. This implies that the cost of 592 
implementing equity can lower the company’s asset-to-equity ratio. Similarly, the 593 
greater the weight 𝜑 assigned to the manager’s objective function, the lower the 594 
optimal cost of equity required to attain optimality.  595 
The optimal cost of debt is impacted by the ratio of the total assets to the tax-deductible 596 
value of the use of debt finance and the debtholder’s assigned weight. From equation 597 
(31), the higher the weight 𝜑 assigned to the manager’s objective function, the higher 598 
the optimal cost of debt required by the debtholder. The contraposition is that the 599 
higher the weight assigned to the debtholder (1 − 𝜑), the lower the optimal cost of 600 
debt. Thus, it is more optimal to assign a lower weight or priority to the manager’s 601 
utility function.  602 
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4 Results 603 
Nikooeinejad, Delavarkhalafi and Heydari (2016) thoroughly discuss the difficulty in 604 
solving two-points boundary value problems analytically and the need for numerical 605 
solutions for dynamic games. Due to the non-linearity of the developed model, the 606 
remaining solutions are obtained via a numerical algorithm. The model is applied to 607 
financial data from a company. The numerical code was simulated in the Matlab2018b 608 
(64-bits) programming environment. The numerical algorithm was devised to generate 609 
an approximation for a pair of Nash equilibrium piecewise continuous strategies that 610 
yield the optimal state values and optimal capital structure for the non-cooperative 611 
game analysis. Similarly, they produce optimal results for the Pareto case. The fourth 612 
order Runge-Kutta (RK4) numerical method is used to solve the boundary value 613 
problem using the forward-backward sweep approach. The procedure for the RK4 614 
forward-backward sweep approach is as follows: initial guesses are provided for the 615 
control or strategy variables 𝑙(𝑡), 𝑐(𝑡) specified as zero, using the initial values of the 616 
state variables 𝑀(𝑡), 𝐷(𝑡) collected from the financial statements, the states are 617 
solved forward in time following the differential equations in the optimality system, 618 
using the transversality condition 𝜆(𝑇) = 𝜙(𝑇) = 0, and the values for (𝑙(𝑡), 𝑐(𝑡), 𝑀(𝑡), 619 
𝐷(𝑡)), 𝜆(𝑡) and 𝜙(𝑡) are solved backward in time, 𝑙(𝑡), 𝑐(𝑡) are updated using the 620 
values of 𝑀(𝑡), 𝐷(𝑡), 𝜆(𝑡), 𝜙(𝑡) in the characterization of the optimal strategies, finally, 621 
convergence is confirmed if the values of the variables in a current iteration is close to 622 
the last iteration such that 𝛿||𝑙(𝑡)|| − ||𝑙(𝑡) − 𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑙(𝑡)|| ≥ 0 and 𝛿||𝑐(𝑡)|| − ||𝑐(𝑡) −623 
𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑐(𝑡)|| ≥ 0, else the process is restarted until convergence is attained. 624 
The results obtained are computed graphically, discussed and compared to provide 625 
implications of the model. Financial variables obtained from the company’s 2018 626 
financial statements to obtain numerical results for the model application are 627 
presented below. 628 
Table 2 Financial data from a company 629 
Parameters Definition and Code Data 
𝑟 Rate of return on Liquid reserve 𝑟 > 0, assumed to 
be constant - Current (As of May 2019) 




𝛽 Payout rate of productive assets, assumed to be 
constant - Assumed 
0.30 
𝑀(0) Initial value of liquid reserve - financial data (AUD 
$b) 
2.40 
𝑆(0) Initial value of company’s productive assets - 
financial data (AUD $b) 
1.30 
𝐷(0) Initial market value of company debt - financial 
data (AUD $b), calculated as the interest-bearing 
current liabilities plus total non-current liabilities 
0.27 
𝜃 Applicable effective tax rate, ranging between 0 and 
1 
0.28 
𝛼 An average of the rate of change in use of debt over 
a 6-year financial period (2013 - 2018) 
0.01 
𝜌 Discount rate - Assumed 0.001 
 630 
The simulated results for the open-loop case are given as follows in table 4. The Nash 631 
Equilibrium strategies over time are presented in figures 4. Where unspecified on the 632 
figure, the parameters do not have units on the y-axis.  633 
Table 3 Open-loop Nash Equilibrium Outcomes for Encounters (1 - 3) 634 
Encounter 𝜌 𝑀(0) 𝐷(0) 𝑀(𝑇) 𝐷(𝑇) 𝜔1, 𝜔2, 𝜔3 𝛾1, 𝛾2 
1 0.001 2.400 0.270 2.494 0.374 [2 2 5] [5 2] 
2 0.001 2.400 0.270 2.092 0.778 [2 2 5] [5 10] 




Figure 4 Open-loop Nash equilibrium pair of Strategies 637 
 638 
For the open-loop case, the optimal capital structure from the study suggests a higher 639 
cost of debt than a higher cost of equity. In addition, payouts (cost of equity) should 640 
be returned into the firm’s fund pool rather than as a cash outflow.  This can be done 641 
by repurchasing shares rather than paying out dividends. Moreover, share 642 
repurchases may be encouraged by low capital gain rates (Allen & Morris 2014). 643 
Although payout policy conveys information to the capital market about the health and 644 
ability of a company to produce cash flows (signalling motives), a firm is limited by the 645 
availability of its free cashflows (Copeland, Weston & Shastri 2014). 646 
 647 
The feedback Nash outcomes are presented in table 4 and figure 5. 648 
Table 4 Feedback Nash Equilibrium Outcomes for Encounters (1 - 3) 649 
Encounter 𝜌 𝑀(0) 𝐷(0) 𝑀(𝑇) 𝐷(𝑇) 𝜔1, 𝜔2, 𝜔3 𝛾1, 𝛾2  
1 0.001 2.400 0.270 2.494 0.374 [2 2 5] [5 2] 
2 0.001 2.400 0.270 2.099 0.778 [2 2 5] [5 10] 








































Figure 5 Feedback Nash equilibrium pair of Strategies 653 
With a minimal reaction from the debtholder, from figure 5, the result for the FNE case 654 
is similar to those of the open-loop case, except that the manager adjusts his 655 
equilibrium strategy to a higher cost of equity, and thus show only a marginal 656 
difference in the outcomes. In contrast to Liu et al. (2017), in which the optimal cost of 657 
debt is found to be increasing, in this study the optimal cost of debt required declines 658 
over the time period due to the long-term relationship. 659 
Achieving cooperation between the players present a mechanism that resolves the 660 
agency problem. An optimal solution found for each weight 𝜑, 0 < 𝜑 < 1 yields a point 661 
on the Pareto frontier. To obtain the Pareto frontiers, the optimal strategies and states 662 
were obtained for each 𝜑 = [0.1, … 0.9]. Weights 0 and 1 have been excluded because 663 
a player will not remain in a game if his interest is set to 0. The returned equilibrium 664 
values at each weight share are then imputed into the individual payoff functions 665 
(objective functionals) of each player independently, thereby producing the manager 666 











































and debtholder’s payoff for each weight share. The values for the manager’s payoff 667 
are then plotted against those of the debtholder, to observe the outcome for both 668 
players in the Pareto frontiers as seen in Figure 6. From the Pareto frontiers, the 669 
weight assignment with the optimal payoff is at (0.1, 0.9).  670 
 671 
Figure 6  Pareto Frontier 672 
4.1 Comparison of the Open-loop, Feedback and Pareto Solution for the weight 673 
share [0.1, 0.9] and [0.7, 0.3] 674 
It offers insights to compare the over time outcomes for the value of liquid reserve 675 
𝑀(𝑡) and debt 𝐷(𝑡) of the three solution concepts. The sub-optimal [0.7, 0.3] and 676 
optimal Pareto outcomes [0.1, 0.9] are compared with the open-loop and feedback 677 
Nash outcomes for all encounters in figure 7 and figure 8. This is done for liquid 678 
reserve and value of debt over time. This is also done to identify the trigger strategies 679 
presented by the debtholder when the manager shifts from the optimal strategy and 680 
reneges on the terms of cooperation.  681 
 29 
 682 
Figure 7 Firm liquid reserve over time 683 
 684 
Figure 8 Market value of debt over time 685 











































































































Figure 9 below presents the optimal capital structure over a ten-year period. This is 686 
compared for the open-loop and feedback case, as well as the pareto case at the 687 
optimal and sub-optimal weight assignment. 688 
 689 
Figure 9 Optimal Debt-Equity Ratio (Open-loop, Feedback and Pareto cases) 690 
 691 
The optimal capital structure obtained enhances the firm’s ability to finance potential 692 
investments as the firm’s financial income and operating income increases. This 693 
empowers the manager to make appropriate investment decisions in the time-period 694 
considered. The graph of the optimal capital structure in the cooperative game is 695 
slightly convex or concave up while the graph of the optimal capital structure for the 696 
non-cooperative game is concave down. This implies that a marginally lower debt-697 
equity ratio is required when the players can reach cooperation in contrast to the non-698 
cooperative case. Since the Pareto case presents more gains than the non-699 
cooperative case, any of the encounters are wealth maximizing for the players, 700 
however with a preference for encounter 3 where the debtholder enjoys the optimal 701 
payoff, see figure 6. Further implications are discussed in section 4.2. 702 








































4.2 Implications for Corporate Governance, Optimal Capital Structure and 703 
Dynamic Game Theory 704 
The implications of the results of the differential game theory-based financial 705 
management model for corporate governance, optimal capital structure and dynamic 706 
game theory are discussed below.  707 
1.) The Nash strategies proposed by the optimal cost of debt and equity as shown 708 
in figures 4 and 5 causes an improvement in the firm’s liquid reserve over time 709 
in encounter 1 and 3 for the feedback and open-loop non-cooperative cases. 710 
The result for the liquid reserve levelled out towards a maximum at the near 711 
end of the contract when the debtholder does not incur an excessive monitoring 712 
cost on the firm. This shows the decreasing marginal effect of the use of debt 713 
towards the end of the contract. This provides salient recommendations for a 714 
manager in estimating the weighted average cost of capital required to optimize 715 
the capital structure while cooperation is yet to be attained.  716 
2.) Similarly, in the absence of cooperation, during the debt maturity period, it is 717 
recommended that the company’s payouts, that is cost of equity should be 718 
returned into the company’s fund pool rather than as a cash outflow, e.g., via 719 
share repurchase. Thus, a capital distribution may be avoided. This result 720 
agrees with Lepetit et al. (2018) which established that a company’s payout 721 
policy is significantly dependent on the degree of agency conflicts between 722 
shareholders and debtholders. Further, the optimal payout policy (cost of 723 
equity) can serve as a complementary mechanism for the firm in cushioning the 724 
effects of the debtholder’s stringent actions on the firm, particularly when 725 
cooperation is yet to be attained. 726 
3.) Additionally, the cost of debt which is the debtholder’s response to the agency 727 
issue declines overtime because long-term relationship can minimize 728 
information asymmetries between the debtholder and the firm and can thus 729 
reduce agency problems, consequently the agency cost of debt (Fukuda & 730 
Hirota 1996). 731 
4.) When compared with interest bearing borrowings and other long-term debt, the 732 
initial values of the financial data reveal a low debt to equity ratio was 733 
maintained at the start of the dynamic game. The optimal capital structure 734 
obtained in this study permits for a greater use of debt to equity than is currently 735 
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being used, up to the maximum recommended by the optimal debt-equity ratio 736 
obtained in figure 9. This result is consistent with He (2011), Mu, Wang and 737 
Yang (2017) and Qu et al. (2018) which suggest a need for higher leverage 738 
when moral hazard is present even between the shareholder and manager in 739 
contrast to Leland (1994), a no moral hazard problem. However, when the two 740 
players can reach cooperation, a lower use of debt is required for an optimal 741 
capital structure. This implies that cooperation reduces the weight of the optimal 742 
leverage required by the company. The optimal capital structure and optimal 743 
cost of financing obtained are provided as corporate governance mechanisms 744 
that minimizes the marginal agency cost of debt associated with the issuance 745 
of debt.  746 
5.) Cooperation as a mechanism via the Pareto case minimizes the conflicts of 747 
interests between the two players by disincentivising the manager from 748 
substituting the company’s asset, which jeopardises the debtholder’s value 749 
maximization. From the results of the study, the incentives proposed by the 750 
debtholder includes the provision of a lower and more consistent cost of debt 751 
as well as more debt facility for the company. These are described as a fair 752 
distribution of the gains from cooperation (Trost & Heim 2018). The relationship 753 
between the company’s cost of debt, new debt and total debt was linear in the 754 
Pareto case but non-linear in the non-cooperative case. Thus, suggests a more 755 
reliable relationship between the players over time. The Pareto optimal solution 756 
in the cooperative analysis is to assign a lower weight 𝜑 to the manager’s 757 
objective functional, and a higher weight to the debtholder’s objective 758 
functional. This is logical because it enhances the interest of the debtholder in 759 
the debt contract or strategic game relationship. 760 
6.) During the cooperation, a selfish manager has an incentive, albeit minimal to 761 
shift from the optimal pair of weight [0.1, 0.9] to an opportunistic weight 762 
assignment [0.7, 0.3], as this provides the firm a minimally higher liquid reserve 763 
as seen in figure 7. This proves the theory of Pareto optimality, which states in 764 
part that it is impossible to allocate resources in a way that makes one player 765 
better off without making the other player worse-off. If a selfish manager 766 
reneges from the Pareto optimal strategy, the debtholder responds by 767 
increasing the firm’s cost of debt and reducing its available debt facility. This is 768 
observed by the lower value of debt finance available to the firm as seen in 769 
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Figure 9 when the optimal pair of weight [0.1, 0.9] are compared to the 770 
suboptimal weight assignment [0.7, 0.3]. These are trigger strategies that 771 
enforce cooperation and ensure renegotiation-proofness. 772 
7.) Over time, in the dynamic game relationship, the private information held by the 773 
manager may be revealed through the company’s regulatory reporting such as 774 
annual reports, annual corporate governance statements and other forms of 775 
external reporting demanded by the debtholder. Additionally, in a dynamic 776 
game, the constrained efficiency of the contractual outcome should be affected 777 
by the repeated interactions (Bolton & Dewatripont 2005). From the results, due 778 
to the repeated interactions in the optimal contract observable from the pareto-779 
efficient outcome, it is observed that the company enjoys a stable and an 780 
efficient cost of debt, a greater provision of debt facility, and a higher liquid 781 
reserve overtime.  782 
5 Summary and Conclusion 783 
One main drawback of debt as a key corporate governance mechanism as established 784 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976) is that it introduces the asset substitution moral hazard 785 
problem in the debtholder-manager agency relationship. Most studies have focused 786 
on observing the impact of the moral hazard problem on a firm’s capital structure. 787 
However, there has been a number of studies designed to minimize the problem. We 788 
have offered a more tractable framework using differential game theory to design and 789 
observe the contract dynamically. We obtain a Pareto-efficient outcome that minimizes 790 
the agency problem and compare these outcomes with non-cooperative scenarios to 791 
highlight the benefits of the joint optimisation approach. These provide 792 
recommendations for a manager about the optimal financing strategies and the 793 
optimal capital structure required for the firm when there are significant effects of 794 
agency cost of debts.  795 
For an optimal capital structure in the non-cooperative game, the manager adopts a 796 
higher cost of debt and lower cost of equity for the company and avoids capital 797 
distribution until the debt matures. The pareto-efficient outcome provides incentives 798 
and trigger strategies which serves as corporate governance mechanisms to align the 799 
interests of the two parties. Generally, the gains of cooperation were higher than the 800 
open-loop and feedback non-cooperative cases for the manager and thus induces him 801 
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to select the pareto-efficient outcome. The gains include provision of more debt facility 802 
with lower and more consistent cost of debt and improved earnings. 803 
The study has modelled the strategic interactions between the debtholder and 804 
manager as a dynamic game, and designed mechanisms to minimize the inherent 805 
conflicts of interests for specifying an optimal capital structure. Optimal mechanisms 806 
are important for company’s growth. However, managers may make financing policies 807 
at the expense of an effective debt-management policy. The modelling in this paper 808 
laid a template for efficient and effective interactions between manager and 809 
debtholders. When such optimal strategies are followed, it provides a framework for 810 
successful organizational management. 811 
Future research in line of this study will include the signalling use of the state variables 812 
and the use of other complementary corporate governance mechanisms in minimizing 813 
the highlighted agency cost of debt. 814 
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